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Price stickiness has a central role in macroeconomics and, besides a vast theoretical literature, it has
generatednumerousempiricalstudies tryingto explainits originsand gaugeits importance. Aconsen-
sual findingof this workis that prices at the micro level mayremain unchangedfor periodsthat can last
up to several months. Studies documenting this stylised fact include, among many others, Bils and
Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), and Nakamura and Steinson (2008), who study con-
sumer prices in the United States (US), and Dhyne et al. (2006) and Vermeulen et al. (2007), who give
asynthesisofstudiescarriedoutfortheEuroArea(EA).Forexample,usingcomparablemicrodataon
consumer prices, Dhyne et al. (2006) find that the estimated monthly frequency of price changes is
around 15 percent in the EAand 25 percent in the US, and that the implied average duration of a price
spell is 13 months in the EAand 6.7 months in the US. These results are consistent withevidencefrom
survey data: according to Fabiani et al. (2006), the median frequency of price changes is one per year
in the EA, lower than the estimated 1.4 price changes per year in the US reported in Blinder et al.
(1998).
The empirical literature investigating the reasons for such infrequent price changes at the firm-level is,
however, scanter. Dhyneet al. (2008)have recentlymade an important contributionto the understand-
ing of this phenomenonbydistinguishingbetweenintrinsic price rigidity(price rigiditythat is inherentto
the price-setting mechanism), and extrinsic rigidity(price rigiditythat is induced by a lowdegree of vol-
atility of shocks to the marginal cost and/or the desired mark-up). They find that the differences across
products in the frequency of price changes do not strictly correspond to differences in intrinsic price ri-
gidity, i.e., the frequency of price changes also depends, in a significant way, on the magnitude of the
shocks to the unobserved optimal price. Thus, as Blinder (1991, p. 94) puts it: “From the point of view
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**** Department of Economics, University of Essex and CEMAPRE.of macroeconomic theory, frequency of price change may not be the right question to ask, for it de-
pends as much on the frequency of shocks as on the firms’pricing strategies. We are more interested
to know how long price adjustments lag behind shocks to demand and cost”.
Therefore, rather than looking into the reasons for infrequent price changes, as done in most of the
previous literature on price stickiness (Munnick and Xu, 2007, Vermeulen et al., 2007, Dhyne et al.,
2006, and the references therein), in this paper we directly investigate the deeper and more meaning-
ful question of the determinants of the speed of price adjustments to demand and cost shocks. In par-
ticular, we use survey data on price adjustment lags reported by Portuguese firms to investigate how
theyadjusttheirpricesinresponseto changesinmarket conditions.The advantageof usingsuchdata
is that, in order to study the intrinsic price rigidity, wedo not need to match market conditions withprice
changes decisions, which is usually a difficult task.
A potential disadvantage of our dataset is that it does not distinguish between aggregate and idiosyn-
craticshocks.Indeed,theeconomicliteraturehasstressedthat thereactionof firms to shocksmayde-
pend on whether these are aggregate or idiosyncratic (Lucas 1973), and recently Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2009) developed a model in which firms’ prices react quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, but
only slowlyto aggregate shocks. The fact that our data has no information on whetherthe shock is ag-
gregate or idiosyncratic is an important limitation that should be borne in mind when evaluating the
findings in this paper.
1
In this paper we tackle several interesting questions. Do prices respond with different lags to demand
and cost shocks? Do prices respond differently to shocks that would imply a rise in prices than to
shocks that would imply a fall in prices? Are prices stickier when a firm operates in a less competitive
industry?Doespricestickinessdependonhowlongfirmshavebeendealingwiththeircustomers?Are
prices stickier when goods are sold in foreign markets? Do the competitiveness factors affect the de-
gree of price stickiness and, if so, in which direction?
The analysisisconductedinthecontextofapanel-orderedprobitmodelthatallowsforthepresenceof
unobservedfirm-specific random-effects. This a major distinguishingfeature of our approach, whichin
ourviewallowsaricheranalysisofthedatathanthesimpleprobitmodelsusedsofarintheliterature.
We find that adjustmentlagsto cost anddemandshocks (eitherpositiveor negative),varysignificantly
with firm characteristics such as the type of pricing policy, cost structure, and sources of competitive-
ness, among others. Interestingly, and in contrast to what one could expect, measures of the impor-
tance of explicit and implicit contracts — two of the most cited sticky-price theories in firms’surveys —
do not emerge as having significant implications for the speed of price reaction to demand or cost
shocks. The evidence also suggests that firms with similar characteristics react asymmetrically to
positive and negative shocks.
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(1) Anotherpotentialdisadvantageofthistypeofdataisthatthesearereported,notactual,lagsanditisimpossibletoknowwhethertheanswersprovidedare
close to reality. However, the fact that in our modelwe only use the ordinalinformationin the answersgivenby the firms will significantlymitigate potential
measurement errors. 11111111111 1As a by-product of our analysis, we also explore the information provided by the firms on the relative
importance of different sticky-price theories as determinants of price adjustment lags. Since the pio-
neeringworkofBlinderetal.(1998),severalsurveyshaveaskedfirmstorankthemainreasonsunder-
lying infrequent price changes or infrequent price reviews (see, for instance, Almirault et al., 2006,
Fabiani et al., 2006, and the references therein), and this information has been used to empirically as-
sess the relevance of alternative sticky-price theories. Although this information may allowthe evalua-
tion of the relative importance of intrinsic and extrinsic price rigidity,
2 we find that the rankings of
sticky-price theories as reported directly by firms do not help explaining the differences in price
adjustment lags.
The rest of the article is organised as follows.Section 2 presents the theoretical background whichun-
derliesthe estimatedmodel.Section3 describesthe dataset usedandpresents the results of a prelim-
inary data analysis. Section 4 presents the estimated model and discusses the main results. Finally,
Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Individual firms do not continuously adjust their prices in response to shocks that hit the economy. To
model this fact, the economic literature considers mainly two types of pricing behaviour: time depend-
ent and state dependent pricing rules. According to the former, firms are assumed to change their
prices periodically using either a deterministic (Taylor, 1980) or a stochastic (Calvo, 1983) process of
price adjustment, i.e., the timing of the price changes is exogenous and does not depend either on the
state of the economy or on the timing of the shocks.
Firms followingstate-dependentpricing rules are usuallyassumed to reviewtheir prices wheneverrel-
evant shocks hit the economy, but, due to the existenceof fixed costs of changingprices (e.g., the cost
of printing and distributing new price lists), they change their prices only when the difference between
the actual and target prices is large enough (see, for example, Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977, Caplin
and Spulber, 1987, Caballero and Engel, 1993, Dotsey et al., 1999). Thus, a company facing these
menu costs will change its price less frequently than an otherwise identical firm without such costs.
Some authors have, however, argued that the main benefit of infrequent price changes is not lower
menucosts,butreductionofthecostsassociatedwithinformationcollectionanddecision-making.Ob-
taining this benefit necessarilymeans that the timing of the occasions upon whichprices are reconsid-
ered may be largely independent of current market conditions (see Woodford, 2003, Zbaracki et al.,
2004). In the same vein, Ball and Mankiw(1994a) argue that “the most important costs of price adjust-
ment are the time and attention required of managers to gather the relevant information and to make
and implement decisions”.
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(2) Among the many reasons for price stickiness suggested to firms in the surveys, some may be seen as relating to extrinsic rigidities (for example, the
importance of changes in variable costs induced by shocks) and some to intrinsic rigidities (for example, the importance of information and menu costs). 222222222 2In addition to menu costs and/or information costs, economic theory has suggested a large number of
other potential explanations for the existence of price rigidities, of which the theories of explicit and/or
implicit contracts, cost-based pricing, coordination failure, and pricing thresholds, are notable
examples.
With explicit contracts, firms aim at building long-term relationships with their customer in order to sta-
bilise their future sales. Customers, on the other hand, are attracted by a constant price because it
makes their future costs more predictable and helps to minimize transaction costs (e.g., shopping
time). In turn, the theory of implicit contracts is based on the idea that firms try to win customer loyalty
by changing prices as little as possible. The idea that explicit contracts may be central for price sticki-
ness was first introduced in the economic literature through wage contracts (see, for instance, Fisher,
1977), while the idea of implicit contracts goes back to Okun (1981), who distinguishes between price
increases due to cost shocks and those that are due to demand shocks. He argues that higher costs
are an accepted rationale for rising prices, while increases in demand are viewed as unfair. Conse-
quently,firmsholdpricesconstantinthefaceofdemandshocks,astheydonotwanttojeopardisecus-
tomer relations. The idea that consumers wish to buy from firms whose prices are fair is also stressed
by Rotemberg (2005).
Rather than emphasizing the firm-customer relation, the theory of coordination failure focuses on the
interaction between firms as the explanation for sticky prices. Like in the case of explicit contracts, the
idea was first introduced for the analysis of the labour market (see, for instance, Clower, 1965). After a
shock,afirmmightwanttochangeitsprice,butonlyiftheotherfirmschangetheirpricestoo.Withouta
coordinatingmechanismwhichallowsthefirmstomovetogether,thepricesmightremainunchanged.
As regards the cost-based pricing theory, the idea is that input costs are an important determinant in
firms’ pricing decision, and that if costs do not change, prices will not change either. Basically, this
meansthat pricesdonot changebecauseotherprices(inputcosts) donot change(seeHall,1986).Fi-
nally, some firms set their prices at psychologically attractive thresholds. This pricing strategy can
cause price stickiness because, in face of small shocks calling for small price changes, firms might not
react and postpone price adjustments until new events justify a price change to the next pricing
threshold.
The different sticky-price theories discussed above have informed most of the empirical research on
theexistenceandsignificanceof infrequentpricechanges,andthepresentworkisnoexceptionto this
trend. A useful way of looking at these sticky-price theories is to think of them as reflecting the exis-
tence of both real and nominal rigidities. As Ball and Romer (1990) noticed, nominal price stickiness
dependsnot onlyon the costs of changingnominalprices (nominalfrictions) but also on the benefits of
changing prices (real rigidities). Thus, as a general principle, we may expect that the less (the more)
profits change when firms set their prices away from the optimum, the smaller (the bigger) will be the
benefits from adjusting more rapidly, and so the more slowly (rapidly) firms will adjust their prices to-
wards the optimum. In this paper we look into the factors that may explain why some firms adjust their
prices more rapidly than others. For that purpose, we will look into the factors that might reflect differ-
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that might reflect differences in the firms’ adjustment costs or that might be expected to make profits
more or less sensitive to sub-optimal prices.
3. THE DATA
3.1. Data sources
Most of the data used in this study come from a survey about price setting practices carried out by
Banco de Portugal.
3 In this survey, firms were asked how long they would take to react to significant
cost and demand shocks. More specifically, they were asked the following four questions: 1) After a
significant increase in demand how much time on average elapses before you raise your prices?; 2)
After a significant increase in production costs how much time on average elapses before you raise
your prices?; 3) After a significant fall in demand, how much time on average elapses before you re-
duce your prices?; and 4) After a significant decline in production costs how much time on average
elapses before you reduce your prices?. The responses to these questions, which will be the depend-
ent variable in our model, are recorded as continuous interval data with six categories: 1 - less than
one week; 2 - from one week to one month; 3 - from one month to three months; 4 - from three to six
months;5- fromsixmonthstooneyear;6- thepriceremainedunchanged.Withtheexpressionsignifi-
cant increase or significant decline the authors of the survey seem to have had in mind inducing re-
spondents to interpret the shock as significant enough to lead firms to react to it by changing their
price. Therefore, we interpret option 6 as indicating that the price will eventually change, but the
adjustment lag is longer than one year.
Besidesthe questionson price adjustments lags, the surveyalso contains informationon a largeset of
firms’ characteristics. These include information on the main market of the firm (internal versus exter-
nal market), main destinations of sales (wholesalers vs. retailers, private vs. public sector), number of
competitors, relations withcustomers (long-term vs. short-term), type of product competition (price vs.
quality, differentiation vs. after sales service), price discrimination(same price for all customers vs. de-
cided on a case-by-case basis), price setting decisions (own company vs. external entity, main cus-
tomers vs. main competitors), and reasons for postponing price changes (the risk that competitors do
not follow, existenceof implicit or writtencontracts, cost of changingprices, costs of collectinginforma-
tion, absence of significant changes in variable costs, preference for maintaining prices at
psychological thresholds, etc.).
The information from the survey is supplemented with data from two other sources. From Central de
Balanços, acomprehensivedatasetmaintainedbyBancodePortugalinwhichthebalancesheets and
income statements of most Portuguese firms are registered, we obtain data on the number of employ-
ees, the share of sales that are made abroad, and the shares of labour, inputs and financial costs. Fi-
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(3) For further details on this survey, see Martins (2010). 333333333 3nally, we obtain information about the proportion of domestic and foreign capital of the firm from
Quadros de Pessoal, a large administrative database collected by the Ministry of Employment which,
among other, includes information about all the Portuguese firms with wage earners (size, ownership,
location, etc.).
By combining the three datasets through the individual tax identification number of each firm, we are
able to obtain detailed information on 903 firms from different branches of activity. More specifically,
our sample includes firms with 20 or more employees, from which almost 90 percent belong to Manu-
facturing (NACE - classificationof economicactivities - 15 to 37) and the remainingto Services (NACE
60 to 64, 80 and 85 - Transport, Storage and Communication, Education and Healthcare). Sectors
such as agriculture, construction, or wholesale and retail trade are not included.
3.2. Preliminary data analysis
As mentioned above, the four survey questions about price adjustment lags are our variates of inter-
est. Table 1 summarises the information on these variables by displaying the distribution of the ob-
served price adjustment lags for each type of shock. These results suggest that firms are quicker to
react to cost shocks, in particular when they are positive, than to demand shocks. For example, only
around 10 percent of the firms keep their prices unchanged in the first year after a positive cost shock,
while the fraction of firms that hold their prices unchanged in response to a positive demand shock is
around35percent.Interestingly, firms seemto react morequicklyto positivecost shocksthanto nega-
tive cost shocks, but to be slowerto react to positive demand shocks than to negative demand shocks.
Aformal test for the hypothesis that the reaction time is the same for positive and negative shocks will
be performed in the next section.
The results of this preliminary analysis, however, are not informative about the possible effect of the
characteristics of the firms on the speed of adjustment. As an illustration of the importance of these
characteristics, Table 2 gives the breakdown by sector and firm size of the firms that do not adjust the
price in the first year after the shock. Clearly, the speed of price adjustment varies with firm sizes and
across sectors. Naturally, all these findings will be taken into account in the econometric analysis we
present in the next Section.
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Table 1
SPEED OF PRICE RESPONSE TO DEMAND AND COST SHOCKS
Cost shocks Demand shocks
Price adjustment lag Positive Negative Positive Negative
1 - less than one week 4.7 3.5 2.8 4.8
2 - from one week to one month 16.8 15.2 12.2 16.8
3 - from 1 month to 3 months 25.0 25.7 19.3 23.4
4 - from 3 to 6 months 17.6 15.0 13.4 13.7
5 - from 6 months to one year 26.3 21.2 17.7 14.0
6 - the price remained unchanged 9.6 19.5 34.7 27.4
Total 100 100 100 100As in similar studies, the survey data also contains information on the reasons why firms may delay
price changes. Specifically, firms were asked to rank the main sticky-price theories according to their
importance in explainingwhyfirms sometimes avoid or postpone price changes in the face of changes
in the relevant economic environment. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree of importance
attached to each theory in a scale ranging from 1 (unimportant) to 4 (very important). Table 3 summa-
rises these results by ranking theories by mean scores.
The results in Table3 arein linewiththe findingsof similarsurveys.For example,implicitcontracts, ex-
plicitcontracts, cost-basedpricingandcoordinationfailure,alsoemergeasthetopfourtheoriesfor the
EA (Fabiani et al., 2006), while coordination failure, cost-based pricing, implicit contracts and explicit
contracts rank first, second, fourth and fifth, respectively, for the US (Blinder et al., 1998). Similar re-
sults were obtained for Sweden (Apel et al., 2005) and the UK (Hall et al., 1997). The results for the
lower part of the ranking are also similar across countries. In these surveys, menu costs and informa-
tion costs systematicallyrank very poorly as explanations for price rigidities. For example, menu costs
rank eighth and information costs ninth out of ten alternative explanations in the EA (Fabiani et al.,
2006), and similar results wereobtainedfor other countries such as the UK, Canadaand Sweden(Hall
et al., 1997, Almirault et al., 2006, Apel et al., 2005).
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Table 2
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS THAT DO NOT CHANGE THEIR PRICES IN THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE SHOCK
Cost shocks Demand shocks
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Manufacturing 8.5 17.5 33.0 25.1
Services 20.0 37.8 50.0 47.8
Small firms 9.0 18.7 35.2 27.1
Large firms 13.5 24.1 31.6 28.6
Total 9.6 19.5 34.7 27.4
Note:Smallandlargefirmsarefirmswithupto250employeesandmorethat250employees,respectively.Thepercentagesinthetablearecomputedasaproportionofthetotalnumber
of firms in the corresponding sector or firm type.
Table 3
THEORIES OF PRICE STICKINESS (MEAN SCORES)
Sectors Size
Theory Total Manufacturing Services Small Large
Implicit contracts 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.0
Coordination failure 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.8
Cost-based pricing 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.6
Explicit contracts 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.8
Temporary shock 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.5
Quality signal 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2
Menu costs 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.8
Costly information 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6
Pricing thresholds 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6Intheliterature,therankingsofsticky-pricetheorieshavebeenusedeitherdirectly, asawayofranking
the importance of the different sticky-price theories (see, among others, Fabiani et al., 2006, and the
references therein), or indirectly through regression analyses, to explain the frequency of price
changes (see, for instance, Munnick and Xu, 2007). However, although these rankings provide evi-
dence on the causes of the existence of price adjustment lags, they tell us little about the length of the
lags and on how these vary across firms, which is the main purpose of this paper. For this reason, in
the model to be presented in the next Section, the rankings of the sticky-price theories as reported by
the firms are not used as covariates. Rather, and for the reasons explainedabove, wewilllook into the
factors that might reflect differences in the relativeimportance of the alternativesticky-pricetheoriesat
the firm-level by identifying the factors that might affect the firms’ adjustment costs, or that are ex-
pected to affect the sensitivity of profits to deviations from the optimal price.
4. AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR PRICE ADJUSTMENT LAGS
The model we use to gauge the impacts of the different covariates on the lags of price adjustments
takes into account both the interval nature of the data and the fact that each firm contributes to the
sample withfour observations. We therefore use a panel-orderedprobit model that allowsfor the pres-
ence of unobserved firm-specific effects.
4 More specifically, we model the latent variable yij, which
representsthetimefirmi takestoreacttoashockoftype j, asafunctionofasetoffirm characteristics.
Because yij is not fully observable, and due to the potential existence of reporting errors, our model
uses only the ordinal information provided by the firms. That is, the dependent variable in our model is
~ ym ij , wherem  12 6 ,, . . , indicates one of the six possible response categories.
Because the preliminary data analysis suggests that the speed of price adjustment is shock specific,
we estimate a model which allows for the possibility of different coefficients for each type of shock, in-
cluding different cut-off parameters and different variances for the non-observed stochastic compo-
nents.
5
To complete the model specification it is necessary to define the set of regressors to use. As men-
tioned above, this choice was guided by the literature on the sticky-price theories briefly reviewed in
Section 2. Ultimately, the importance of the different sticky-price theories at the firm-level may be cap-
tured by the characteristics of the firm itself, the good that is produced, or the sector in which the firm
operates. For this reason, wehave chosen as regressors sectoral, product, and firm-level characteris-
tics that may be related directly to the above discussed sticky-price theories, or may be expected to
make profits more or less sensitive to shocks.
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(4) This a major distinguishingfeature of our approach, which in our view allows a richer analysis of the data than the simple probit models used so far in the
literature. To our knowledge,all the papersin the empiricalliteraturethat have lookedat the speedof price reactionsby firms in face of demandand costs
shocks, haveestimatedbinaryprobitmodels.In thesemodelsthedependentvariableis definedsuchthat it equals1if thepricereactionoccursinthefirst
three months (say) after the shock and is zero otherwise,or such that it equalsone, if the firm reports that it reacts to shocks (and is zero otherwise).As a
robustnesscheckwealsoestimatedabinaryprobitmodel(allowingforunobservedheterogeneity)withthedependentvariabledefinedsuchthatitequals1
if the adjustment takes more than one month and equalszero otherwise. Althoughthe point-estimates obtainedwith this model are not very different from
those of the ordered model, the binary model is considerably less efficient and therefore most of its parameters are not statistically significant. 444444444 4
(5) Therefore,thisisalmostequivalenttoestimatingfourdifferentmodels,oneforeachtypeofshock,withthedifferencebeingthatinourcasethemodelsare
linkedbytheunobservedheterogeneitycomponent,whichisassumedtobecommontothefourshocks.FurtherdetailsonthemodelmaybeseeninDiaset
al. (2009). 555555555 5The Appendix describes the different regressors and provides the corresponding summary statistics,
and Table 4 presents the results of the estimated model.
6 For ease of presentation we grouped these
variables into the following six categories: 1) Price setting practices, 2) Cost structure, 3) Market envi-
ronment, 4) Source of competitiveness, 5) Type of good, and 6) Other characteristics.
Price setting practices
This category includes six regressors that we view as affecting directly the ability of the firm to change its
price in the event of a shock: the proportion of sales under written contracts, information on whether the
relation with the customers is essentially of a long- or short-term nature, information on whether the firm
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Table 4
PANEL-ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR THE PRICE ADJUSTMENT LAGS
Cost shocks Demand shocks
Covariates Positive Negative Positive Negative
Constant 3.477** 4.665** 3.345** 3.611**
(0.327) (0.448) (0.321) (0.382)
Explicit contracts 0.041 -0.037 0.073 0.116
(0.127) (0.154) (0.123) (0.146)
Implicit contracts -0.142 -0.114 0.101 -0.196
(0.148) (0.180) (0.143) (0.171)
Price discrimination -0.392** -0.383* -0.565** -0.621**
(0.163) (0.198) (0.160) (0.189)
Quantity discount -0.425** -0.301* -0.402** -0.430**
(0.152) (0.184) (0.149) (0.176)
Price set by customers 0.418** -0.213 0.113 -0.139
(0.181) (0.219) (0.174) (0.206)
Price set by competitors 0.314* -0.079 -0.408** -0.671**
(0.163) (0.196) (0.156) (0.186)
Labour costs 0.417** 0.394** 0.413** 0.514**
(0.122) (0.149) (0.119) (0.141)
Intermediate input costs -0.252** -0.291* -0.052 0.036
(0.126) (0.153) (0.122) (0.144)
Competition -0.358** -0.366** -0.302** -0.399**
(0.136) (0.165) (0.132) (0.157)
Domestic market -0.029 -0.067 0.047 0.233
(0.128) (0.154) (0.123) (0.146)
Price competitiv. -0.027 -0.241* -0.213* -0.407**
(0.113) (0.137) (0.109) (0.130)
Quality competitiv. 0.271** 0.204 0.314** 0.489**
(0.130) (0.157) (0.125) (0.150)
Delivery competitiv. -0.091 -0.107 0.268** 0.301**
(0.111) (0.134) (0.108) (0.128)
Services 1.035** 1.112** 0.561** 0.951**
(0.205) (0.253) (0.199) (0.238)
Intermediate goods -0.263** -0.424** -0.419** -0.418**
(0.158) (0.151) (0.120) (0.143)
Size 0.352** 0.520** -0.134 0.164
(0.157) (0.193) (0.152) (0.181)
Capital structure -0.418** -0.477** -0.146 -0.270
(0.177) (0.216) (0.171) (0.202)
Note: Standard errors computed from analytical second derivatives are in parenthesis. **Marks significance at 5%; *marks significance at 10% level.
(6) Giventhedefinitionofthecategoricalvariables(givenintheAppendix),thereferenceorbaselinegroupiscomposedoffirmsforwhich:a)theproportionof
salesunderwrittencontractsislessthan50percent;b)therelationshipwiththeircustomersisessentiallyofashort-termnature;c)thepriceisthesamefor
all customers (absence of price discrimination) and there are no quantity discount prices; d) the price of the product is set by the firm itself and not bya n
externalentity, includingthe main competitors or main customers; e) the share of labourandinputcosts are belowthe correspondingmedianshare; f) the
numberofcompetitorsislessthan5;g)exportsrepresentmorethan50percentoftheirmainproduct;h)price,qualityanddeliverytimearenotconsidered
veryimportantfactorsforthecompetitivenessofthemainproduct;i)belongtothemanufacturingsector;j)theproductionisessentiallyforfinalconsumption
(the main destination market is composed of wholesalers, retailers or final consumers), as opposed to intermediate consumption; and k) the number of
employees is equal or less than 250. 666666666 6practices price discrimination and/or quantity discounts, and, finally, information on whether the price is
set by the firm’s main customers or main competitors.
The first variable measures how important explicit contracts are for firms’ regular operations, while the
second maybe seen as a proxyfor the existence of implicit contracts. As we have seen in Section 2, eco-
nomic theory suggests that the existence of explicit and/or implicit contracts may be an important source
of price stickiness, and thus may help explaining the lags of price adjustment across firms in the event of
a shock. The results in Table 4, however, show that the coefficients of these two covariates are not statis-
tically different from zero for either of the four shocks. Thus, in contrast to what the analysis in Section 3
could suggest, the fact that the firm has a large proportion of sales under written contracts, or whether the
relationwiththecustomers is essentiallyof along-term nature, does not haveabearingonthespeedwith
which firms adjust prices following significant demand or cost shocks.
In contrast, the type of pricing policy (single price versus price discrimination and existence of quantity
price discounts) emerges as playing an important role in determining the speed of price adjustments.
Firms that decide the price on a case-by-case basis, or that do quantity price discounts, tend to be faster
to adjust to both cost and demand shocks. These results can be interpreted as reflecting the fact that
firms with such flexible pricing practices are likely to face relatively low information, managerial, or menu
costs, which also allow them to react more quickly to shocks.
Finally, we consider two variables related to the firms’lack of autonomy in setting their own prices (as op-
posed to cases in which the price is set by the firm itself). We find that the price set by customers variable
has a positive and significant impact only in the case of positive cost shocks, suggesting that customers
have enough power to delay the firms’ reaction when costs push prices up. Regarding the price set by
competitors variable, our results show that firms that have their prices set by the main competitors are
faster to respond to demand shocks than firms that set their own prices. This suggests that firms whose
prices are set bythe main competitors maybe acting as market followers in a market where the presence
of market leaders helps reducing, or even eliminating, potential coordination problems.
We notice that in our sample onlyabout 12 percent of the firms recognised the lack of autonomyin setting
their own prices (both when they are set by the main customers or by the main competitors), which sug-
gests that these characteristics do not contribute much to explain differences in the speed of price adjust-
ment across firms for the whole economy. In contrast, the type of pricing policy (single price versus price
discrimination and existence of quantity price discounts) may be seen as an important characteristic with
important implications for the speed of price adjustment as 37 percent of the firms set their prices on a
case-by-case basis, and 41 percent do quantity discounts (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
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In order to test whether the cost structure matters for explaining the differences in the lags of price adjust-
ments, we included two variables that measure the importance of labour costs and other input costs (in-
termediateinputs). FromTable4weseethat thesharesof labourandintermediateinput costsemergeas
important factors in explaining the lags of price adjustment. Irrespective of the type of shock, firms with a
labour share above the median tend to be slower to react to shocks. On the other hand, firms with a share
of intermediate input costs above the median tend to react more quickly to cost shocks than otherwise
similar firms.
7
Cost structure is an important determinant of how firms react to cost shocks. In monopolistic competition
models, under quite general conditions, firms choose to charge a price that represents a mark-up over
marginal cost. Thus, for firms following mark-up rules, the higher the volatility of input prices, the higher
will be the frequency with which they change their prices. If input costs are relatively stable, such as
wages which are changed, on average, once a year, prices can also be expected to be relatively stable.
On the contrary, if input costs are highly volatile, in particular some raw materials, the frequency of price
changes could be much higher. Thus, ceteris paribus, one may expect firms with higher labour cost
shares to change their prices less frequently than firms with higher shares of more volatile intermediate
inputs. Our findings suggest that this result translates into the speed of price adjustment to cost shocks:
firms with a higher labour share tend to be slower to react, while firms with a higher share of intermediate
input costs tendtobefaster (seealsoAltissimoet al., 2006). As for demandshocks wemayexpect asim-
ilar result. Infrequent wage changes give rise to flatter product supply curves, making the optimal price
more inelastic to demand shocks. Thus, we may expect demand shocks to have larger implications in
terms of the lags of price adjustments for firms with higher labour cost shares. This is confirmed by our
findings.
Market environment
To capture the market environment in which firms operate, we use a direct measure of market competi-
tion (number of competitors), and information on the main destination market (domestic vs. foreign mar-
ket). According to the estimated model, the degree of competition is a very relevant factor in determining
the speed of price adjustment. Firms in more competitive environments tend to be faster to react to
shocks. Indeed, it is known that the more competitive a sector is, the more sensitive profits are to sub-op-
timal prices. Thus, for given nominal adjustment costs (due for instance to the presence of information or
menu costs) stronger competition may be expected to translate into quicker responses to shocks (see,
for instance, Martin, 1993).
Regarding the market destination variable, we find that the coefficients of the covariate that measures the
importance of the domestic market are not statistically significant for any of the four shocks. Thus,
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(7) This is a very robust result that has been extensively documented in the literature for the frequency of price adjustments (see, among other, Altissimo,
Ehrmann and Smets, 2006, and the references therein). Our results show that the same result is valid for the speed with which firms react toshocks.whether the firm sells their products in the domestic market or abroad does not seem to make a differ-
ence for the speed with which firms react to shocks.
Source of competitiveness
In order to investigate if the different competitiveness factors affect the speed with which firms respond to
shocks, we distinguish between price, quality, and delivery period, as alternative sources of competitive-
ness. It turns out that firms that consider price as an important variable for competitiveness tend to adjust
prices more quickly, while firms that value more the quality of the product or the delivery period as com-
petitiveness factors tendtoadjust their prices at aslower paceinresponsetoshocks (speciallyso, inface
of demand shocks).
We may think of these factors as reflecting different product characteristics which translate into different
demand elasticities (higher demand elasticity for firms for which price is an important factor, and lower
elasticity for firms that value more the quality of the product or the delivery period).
8 In our sample 60 per-
cent of the firms consider price as a very important source of competitiveness, while 77 percent and 51
percent select quality and the delivery period, respectively. These figures suggest that the competitive-
ness factors, especially the price and the delivery period, are important factors in shaping the time
responses to demand shocks across firms.
Type of good
In the data we have information regarding the sector where firms operate (manufacturing or services),
and the destination of the product (final vs. intermediate consumption). As earlier results suggested (see
Table 2), from Table 4 we find that firms that operate in the services sector are substantially slower to re-
act to shocks than firms that operate in the manufacturing sector. The speed of price adjustment also var-
ies according to the type of market for the product. Firms that sell their products to other firms
(intermediate goods) tend to be quicker to adjust their prices than firms whose products are mainly for fi-
nal demand (whose main destinations are wholesalers, retailers or consumers). These results my reflect
the fact that services and final goods are typically more differentiated than manufacturing and
intermediate goods, respectively, and thus face a less elastic demand.
In our sample 31 percent of the firms declared that its main destination market is composed of other com-
panies, which means that the “intermediate goods” covariate may have a significant contribution in ex-
plaining the differences in the lags of price adjustment across firms.
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(8) Martin (1993) showed that the speed of price adjustment increases with the elasticity of demand, that is, firms react faster to shocks when the demand
schedulefacing them is flatter. This same idea was used by Gopinath and Itskhoki (2009) to show the link betweenthe frequency of price adjustment and
exchange rate pass-through. 88888888 8Other characteristics
The last group of variables we considered as potentially relevant to explain the differences in the lags of
price adjustment includes the firm size and the capital structure. In line with the findings fom the previous
section, size matters for the speed of price adjustment. In the face of cost shocks, large firms tend to be
slower at adjusting their prices than small firms. The fact that size matters is probably because the prod-
ucts of large firms are typically more differentiated and therefore face a less elastic demand, or because
firm size is capturing some remaining firm characteristics, like the flexibility of the decision making
process.
As regards the capital structure, we find that firms with a higher share of domestic capital tend to adjust
faster in the face of shocks (especially so in the face of cost shocks), probably because, in contrast to
what can be expected for foreign firms, the decision making process of domestic firms resides inside the
country allowing a prompter reaction to shocks.
Overall we do not expect the covariates “size” and “capital structure” to contribute much to explain the dif-
ferences in the lags of price adjustment, as large firms only represent 15 percent of total firms in the sam-
ple and only 11.6 percent of the firms have a share of foreign capital larger than 50 percent.
Symmetric or asymmetric response lags?
An interesting issue is whether the lags of price adjustments to cost and demand shocks are symmetric
or asymmetric, as the consequences of monetarypolicyshocks might differ depending on the direction of
the shock. There is nowa vast theoretical literature that focus on the question of whether prices are more
sticky in response to a shock that warrants a price decrease than to a price increase. Such asymmetries
may arise because of strategic behaviour (Hansen et al., 1996, Kavenock and Widdows, 1998, Bhaskar,
2002, Devereux and Siu, 2007), adjustment costs under trend inflation (Tsiddon, 1993, Ball and Mankiw,
1994b, Ellingsen et al., 2006), search models (Lewis, 2004, Yang and Ye, 2008, Bayer and Ke, 2009), ca-
pacity constraints (Finn, 1996, Laxton et al. 1996, Loertscher, 2005), inattentive consumers (Chen et al.,
2008), or customer anger (Okun, 1981, Rotemberg, 2005). Importantly, there seems to be no theoretical
unanimity as to whether prices will be more sticky when warranted prices move up or down.
According to the preliminary analysis in Section 2, and in accordance with results found in other coun-
tries, some asymmetry is expected as firms seem to react more quickly to positive than to negative cost
shocks, and more slowly to positive than negative demand shocks. However, formal tests of possible
asymmetric reaction times were not performed, and therefore it is important to investigate whether the
observed differences are statistically significant.
In the context of our model, comparing just the individual coefficients of the covariates for positive and
negativeshocksprovideslittleinformationonthesymmetryof theresponses, becauseof thedifferent pa-
rameters defining the functional form of the model. Therefore, symmetry tests have to conducted by test-
ing not only the coefficients of the covariates, but also all other parameters that are shock specific. The
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of equal coefficients for positive and negative shocks in both cases, so that we conclude that firms react
differently to negative and positive shocks.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates firm-level price rigidities by looking at the lags of price adjustments to demand
and cost shocks, which is a better measure of price rigidities than the commonly used frequency of
price changes.
By estimating a panel-ordered probit model, we find that the lags of price adjustments vary with the
sector, product, and firm characteristics, namelythe competitive environment, the cost structure of the
firm, the different factors of competitiveness, pricing policy, or the type of market for the firm’s product.
These factors, using the terminology in Ball and Romer (1990), affect directly the degree of real rigidi-
ties, which in turn, determines the speed at which firms adjust their prices, for a given level of nominal
adjustment costs (or nominal frictions).
In particular, we document that, ceteris paribus, firms with a high share of labour costs, that value the
quality of the product or the delivery period as important competitiveness factors, that have their price
set by their main customers, are large, or belong to the services sector, tend to be slower to react to
shocks. In turn, firms that operate in a competitive environment, have a large share of other input
costs, consider price as an important competitiveness factor, decide the price on a case-by-case ba-
sis,havetheirpricesetbythemaincompetitors,doquantitydiscountprices,selltheirproductstoother
firms (intermediate goods), or have a large share of national capital, tend to react more quickly to de-
mand or costs shocks. Among these factors, the cost structure (labour share and intermediate input
share), the type of pricing policy (single price versus price discrimination and existence of quantity
price discounts), the competitiveness factors (especially the price and the delivery period), and the
destination of the product (final vs. intermediate consumption), emerge as especially important
characteristics in explaining the differences in the lags of price adjustment across firms.
In contrast to what one could expect, the fact that the firm has a large proportion of sales under written
contracts, orwhethertherelationwiththecustomersisessentiallyofalong-termnature,doesnothave
implications on the speed with which firms adjust prices following significant demand or cost shocks.
Likewise,whetherthefirm sellsits products inthedomesticmarketorabroaddoesnotseemto makea
difference.
Finally, bothfordemandandcostshocks,statisticaltestsclearlyrejectthenullhypothesisthatfirms re-
spond symmetrically to positive and negative shocks.
Overall, the findings in this paper are consistent with the idea that differences in the speed of price ad-
justmentdependonthecostsofchangingnominalprices,aswellasonthesensitivityoffirms’profitsto
deviations from the optimal price, and that firms behave asymmetrically in the face of positive and
negative shocks.
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67APPENDIX
In this Appendix we describe the covariates used in the ordered probit model whose results are pre-
sented in section 4, and provides the corresponding summary statistics. With the exception of “capital
structure” which measures the share of domestic capital in the total capital of the firm, all the other
covariates are dummy variables. The details are as follows:
• Explicit contracts — Equal to one if the percentage of sales under written contracts is larger
than 50 percent of total sales;
￿ Implicit contracts — Equal to one if the relationship with customers is essentially a long-term
one (more than one year);
￿ Price discrimination — Equal to one if the price of the firm’s product is decided in a
case-by-case basis;
￿ Quantity discount — Equal to one if the price depends on the quantity sold but according to a
uniform price list;
￿ Price set by customers — Equal to one if the price of the product is set by the firm’s main
customer(s);
￿ Price set by competitors — Equal to one if the price of the product is set by the firm’s main
competitor(s);
￿ Labour costs — Equal to one if the labour cost share is above the median of the sample;
￿ Intermediate input costs — Equal to one if the other input costs share is above the median of
the sample;
￿ Competition — Equal to one if the number of firm’s competitors is equal to 5 or bigger;
￿ Domestic market — Equal to one if Portugal is the main destination market for the firm’s
product;
￿ Price competitiveness — Equal to one if the firm considers price as a very important factor for
competitiveness;
￿ Quality competitiveness — Equal to one if the firm considers quality as a very important factor
for competitiveness;
￿ Delivery competitiveness — Equal to one if the firm considers delivery period as a very
important factor for competitiveness;
￿ Services — Equal to one if the firm operates in the Services sector;
￿ Intermediate goods — Equal to one if “other companies” is the main destination of sales (as
opposed to wholesalers, retailers, Government, consumers);
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68￿ Size — Equal to one if the number of employees is larger than 250;
￿ Capital structure — Share of domestic capital (owned by Portuguese entrepreneurs) on the
total capital of the firm.
Table A1 summarizes the relative importance in the sample of the above defined covariates. The en-
tries in the Table record the share of firms in each category, with the exception of the labour and inter-
mediate input costs, which represent the corresponding average shares, and the capital structure,
whichrepresentstheshareoffirms whosenationalcapitalaccountsfor50percentormoreoftotalcap-
ital. For instance, from the Table we see that around 83 percent of firms have implicit contracts, i.e.,
theyhave an essentiallylong-term relationshipwithcustomers, and that the distribution of implicit con-
tracts is relatively homogeneous across sectors and do not vary much with the size of firms. In con-
trast, only in about 25 percent of the firms do formal contracts account for 50 percent or more of total
sales (explicit contracts), and its distribution varies significantly across sectors and firms’ size.
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Table A1
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE
Share of firms in each category in percentage
Total
Sectors Firms’ size
Manufacturing Services Small Large
Explicit contracts 25.5 23.9 40.0 23.6 36.1
Implicit contracts 82.6 83.3 76.7 82.0 86.5
Price discrimination 37.4 38.3 30.0 37.8 35.3
Quantity discount 41.0 42.2 30.0 40.8 42.1
Price set by customers 11.7 11.8 11.1 10.9 16.5
Price set by competitors 12.3 12.9 6.7 13.6 4.5
Labour costs
(a) 27.3 26.2 36.8 27.6 25.2
Intermediate input costs
(a) 39.3 43.1 5.1 39.2 40.3
Competition 76.0 74.8 86.7 79.0 58.6
Domestic market 68.4 66.3 87.8 70.5 56.4
Price competitiveness 59.5 61.4 42.2 59.2 60.9
Quality competitiveness 77.0 76.4 82.2 76.1 82.0
Delivery competitiveness 51.1 51.7 45.6 50.0 57.1
Intermediate goods 30.9 30.6 33.3 31.8 25.6
Size (large firms) 15.0 14.5 18.9 – –
Capital Structure
(b) 88.2 87.6 93.2 90.4 75.4
Notes: (a) Average of labour or intermediate input cost share (percent). (b) Share of firms whose national capital accounts for 50 percent or more of total capital.